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CONTRACT STORIES: IMPORTANCE OF THE 
CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO LAW 
Larry A. DiMatteo* 
[A] right text . . . should be a standing introduction. It should be 
simple. It should seem to lie open to a student who has never met 
the law, and give him a footing. He need not fully understand it 
all, or any of it; but out of each page, each sentence, he should 
get enough to carry him along, and what he gets should be 
accurate enough to help him in his work. 
—Karl N. Llewellyn1 
 
[M]uch more important things have commonly been left out of 
the case-book by the [author] than are left in it for the instructor 
to leave out. 
—Karl N. Llewellyn2 
INTRODUCTION 
How law is taught is at the center of the debate over the need to 
change legal education to better prepare students for a difficult and 
changing marketplace for legal services. This Article analyzes the 
benefits of using “stories” to teach law. The stories to be discussed relate 
to contract law: this Article asks whether they can be used to improve 
the method and content of teaching law. The ruminations offered on 
teaching contract law, however, are also relevant to teaching other core, 
first-year law courses. 
The use of contract stories to bring contracts alive, and to better tie 
theory to practice, is based upon the power of narrativity and 
contextualism to deepen the understanding beyond doctrinal analysis. 
The narrative approach to teaching law is at its best when it is highly 
* Huber Hurst Professor of Contract Law, Warrington College of Business Administration; Affiliate 
Professor of Law, Levin College of Law, University of Florida. 
1. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 7 (Oceana Publ’ns 
1960) (1930) (emphasis in original).  
2. Id. at 95. 
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contextualized—including contextual facts of a case (recognized facts); 
context of the law of precedent as a story of legal development; law 
creation within context of a particular cultural, economic, and social era; 
and those elements of case context that are left unrecognized, but likely 
influence party behavior and conduct (e.g., bias, discrimination). This 
Article will discuss these different contextual factors in relationship to 
the narrative approach to teaching law. This broad view of contextualism 
will show how narrativity not only descriptively conveys the law, but 
also will show the normative role of law in society and how law can be 
reformed to enhance that normative role. 
Contract law is the quintessential first-year law school course, often 
taught by the Socratic method of teaching. It introduces students to the 
doctrinal nature of law—as a series of fixed rules, principles, and 
standards. The rules-based nature of contracts allows the Socratic stiletto 
to parse from rule to exception and to exception to exceptions. However, 
the true Socratic teaching of law no longer holds a dominative perch in 
law schools, as it did some twenty or thirty years ago. It was a cherished 
experience when used by my contract law professor, Robert S. 
Summers, of Cornell Law School. But, alas, even by the second 
semester of the first year its ability to rivet student attention began to 
wane. In the end, most of my professors morphed into a lecture-
discussion format. The educational benefits of a hard Socratic method of 
teaching are debatable and whether it is the most efficient method of 
teaching deductive and analogical reasoning is suspect.3 In the end, it 
may be efficient in the hands of a truly gifted Socratic teacher as 
opposed to the lazy, but brilliant, mind able to raise queries with no pre-
mediated path in sight. But, even in the hands of a Socratic master, it can 
be argued that it is a time consuming approach in which the richness of a 
case cannot be completely exploited. The complexity of modern contract 
transactions may require a different approach. 
The different approach will still be a case-based approach, but one in 
which the case is the basis of a story—a story connecting iconic case law 
with modern cases that emphasize the continuity of law, as well as its 
inherent flexibility. This flexibility allows the law to respond to novel 
contract disputes. However, often what may seem novel may not be that 
novel after all. Thus, the tying of cases from different eras of the law 
into a narrative leads to a greater understanding of the dynamic nature of 
law. 
3. See J. T. Dillon, Paper Chase and the Socratic Method of Teaching, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 529 
(1980). 
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This Article examines Lawrence Cunningham’s use of “contract 
stories” in his innovative book, Contracts in the Real World: Stories of 
Popular Contracts and Why They Matter (Contracts in the Real World),4 
to flesh out the importance of narrative and context for understanding 
law and its application to real world disputes. Part II provides some 
initial observations of the Socratic and narrative approaches to teaching 
law and reviews the structure of the law school casebook and the need to 
develop a modern legal textbook that uses cases to weave a narrative of 
the development of legal rules. Part III examines the narrative approach 
to understanding contract law. Part IV looks at the internal-external; 
conceptual-contextual; and descriptive-prescriptive dimensions of law 
and its study. Law is often viewed as an internal, conceptual structure 
that provides the rules, principles, and standards that form the rule of 
law. But how law is applied—more specifically, how it can best be 
applied—is an external, contextual, and prescriptive undertaking. This 
Article argues that the narrative approach is at its best when it immerses 
the cases in their real-world context. This Article offers some general 
remarks on the practical implications of a more contextual-narrative 
approach to learning law and attuning legal education to real-world 
practice. Finally, Part V briefly notes that American law schools need to 
present law in a global context. 
One note in passing: it is clear to many, especially law firms seeking 
to hire new attorneys, that legal education is in need of transformative 
change. True transformative change would be the creation of a totally 
new model of legal education. The German legal education system is an 
example of a completely different approach. In the German legal 
education system, as is the case in most European countries, law is 
offered as an undergraduate degree. However, the trend is that many 
students stay on for a Masters of Law and some for a Ph.D. in the law 
before proceeding on to practice. The Masters and Ph.D. in the law are 
not purely academic in nature, but make students more marketable. 
Following graduation, students must pass a national exam. If successful, 
they are then placed by the government with a law firm or government 
legal office for two years of practice training. Following the two years of 
practice training, students must pass a second bar exam. The idea of 
making students more “marketable” has taken on added significance 
after the 2008 financial crisis and the downturn in the legal job market.5 
4. LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, CONTRACTS IN THE REAL WORLD: STORIES OF POPULAR 
CONTRACTS AND WHY THEY MATTER (2012). 
5. See Eli Wald, Foreword: The Great Recession and the Legal Profession, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2051 (2010). 
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The German legal education system, or the somewhat similar English 
system, offers numerous insights into reforming the American legal 
education system. They produce students with skill-sets and practice 
experience that make them immediately productive to would-be 
employers. However, the American law school model is premised on 
generating three years of tuition revenues. The high costs of legal 
education and the poor state of the legal job market has resulted in a 
dramatic decline in law school applications. Ultimately, for law schools 
to continue admitting the same class sizes they will need to lower 
admission standards, but they will do that at the cost of being less 
competitive in attracting quality students. The lowering of standards will 
make their students less competitive in the legal marketplace, and so it 
will go. The more likely scenario is that schools will maintain their 
standards, which will force them to reduce class sizes. It should also lead 
to a free-market competition to innovate curriculum so that law schools 
can distinguish themselves as better preparing their students for legal 
practice. This will be difficult given traditional mind-sets, but it is the 
challenge that will be necessary to confront. 
The exploration of models of legal education brings us back to the 
questions posed by Karl Llewellyn, some eighty years ago, in his 
infamous diatribe on American legal education, The Bramble Bush: 
What a lawyer does in court, and what he does outside, what 
relationship either court or lawyer has to the law, what relation 
the law school has to any of these things—around these things, I 
take it, there floats a pleasant haze.6 
[W]hat is the orientation of the law school with regard to the 
profession? . . . Why does it offer some things and not others? 
What do you need for your practice which it does not offer?7 
[H]ow does the study of the law here bear upon the work that 
you will do and the life that you will live when you leave this 
school and go into the practice?8 
These are the challenges law school administrators must confront. These 
challenges come at a time of structural change in the legal job market; 
they place law schools in a bind between the need to generate revenues 
and the need for dramatic changes that would likely diminish those 
revenues. Maybe radically changing legal education to include a practice 
component will come from the public universities that are not quite as 
6. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 11. 
7. Id. at 92. 
8. Id. at 11. 
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dependent on tuition-only revenues. Of course, public universities’ 
ability to make such changes would likely be hampered by institutional 
constraints, internal and external to their law schools and their 
universities. 
The need for “radical” change in legal education is an old storyline 
going back many decades through the production of numerous studies. 
As recently as 2007, the “Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching . . . concluded that our nation’s law schools are failing to 
prepare graduates adequately for the practice of law.”9 The Carnegie 
Report supported the MacCrate Report10 sponsored by the American Bar 
Association some two decades earlier. The MacCrate Report 
emphasized the need for enhanced skills training; the Carnegie Report 
also emphasized the need for a more integrated curriculum. More 
recently, proposed law school accreditation standards state that each law 
school “shall identify and publish learning outcomes designed to achieve 
for its students, upon graduation, competency to represent clients and to 
participate effectively, ethically, and responsibly [in] the legal 
profession.”11 
Law practice and legal education have been under attack for some 
time, but in the years since the financial crisis of 2008 there has been a 
shift from intellectual self-critique to professional survival. So change 
will come slowly,12 but it certainly will come. For now, the change will 
be incremental in nature. One of those changes is the topic of the current 
symposium—changing the materials used to better teach students about 
law’s maddening blend of continuity and indeterminacy. 
I. INITIAL OBSERVATIONS 
Looking back at some of my classes so many years ago, the hard 
9. R. Michael Cassidy, Beyond Practical Skills: Nine Steps for Improving Legal Education Now, 
53 B.C. L. REV. 1515, 1515–16 (2013) (citing WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE CARNEGIE 
FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 12 (2007)). 
10. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL EDUCATION 
AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE 
ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 259–60 (1992); see also BRIAN Z. 
TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).  
11. STANDARDS REVIEW COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N, APRIL ‘13 SRC MEETING MATERIALS 73, 82–
83 (2013). 
12. See Nancy B. Rapoport, Eating Our Cake and Having It, Too: Why Real Change Is So 
Difficult in Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 359, 366 & n.26 (2006) (noting that the last major innovation 
in legal education was the introduction of the case method towards the end of the nineteenth 
century). 
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Socratic method of teaching was still ingrained in the first year of law 
school. But, in a number of instances, the pedagogy could not honestly 
be characterized as either “hard” or Socratic. To the truly gifted teacher, 
the Socratic method possesses the ability to train students to think 
critically and analytically. But, for some less gifted professors, the 
Socratic method devolved into using student questioning in a haphazard 
way, and not as a guiding force as it was initially intended. Some 
professors seemed to use it as a way of terrorizing or ridiculing students. 
But does it adequately serve pedagogical objectives? I will simply repeat 
what is stated above—yes, if used by a well-prepared, passionate teacher 
trained in the Socratic method. 
The second question relating to the Socratic method is whether it is an 
efficient methodology for teaching students how to think like a lawyer. 
Part of the question is answered by the above paragraph. The other part 
is that done properly it is a slow device for covering material. Its value is 
in the development of an analytical skill-set. The cost is much less 
substantive coverage than a lecture-discussion-exercise format is able to 
accomplish. In the end, the Socratic method as initially envisioned has 
been dying in American law schools for decades.13 
The next tenet of traditional law school teaching is the case method—
the use of mostly appellate court decisions to illustrate the nuanced 
nature of law. It makes clear that black letter law does not get one very 
far when both parties cite case precedents to support diametrically 
opposed arguments and outcomes. The student is introduced to the 
importance of operative facts in finding precedents, whether mandatory 
or persuasive, and how to distinguish a case from seemly dense case law. 
This is good stuff, but the question again becomes: at what costs to other 
curricular goals? R. Michael Cassidy states that “[p]roviding students 
with the analytical skills necessary to ‘think like lawyers’ by teaching 
them to read and dissect appellate decisions may no longer be sufficient 
to meet the demands of the legal marketplace.”14 
A number of criticisms can be lodged at the traditional case method 
system. First, it is questionable whether a single case or a series of cases 
treated as autonomous units is the best way to impart knowledge of the 
law. Second, cases severed from context provide only a narrow 
13. See Christie A. Linskens, What Critiques Have Been Made of the Socratic Method in Legal 
Education? The Socratic Method in Legal Education: Uses, Abuses and Beyond, 12 EUROPEAN J. L. 
REFORM 340 (2010); Patricia Mell, Taking Socrates’ Pulse, MICH. B.J., May 2002, at 46 (“Today’s 
Socratic method is far less robust in terms of frequency of use and severity of method than was its 
predecessor of 20 or 30 years ago.”). 
14. Cassidy, supra note 9, at 1516. 
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perspective on what internal and external elements may have impacted 
the case. Internally, who were the parties? What were the arguments 
given by the opposing attorneys? Were multiple legal doctrines argued 
in the alternative? Externally, what was the cultural and economic milieu 
of the case? Has society changed in a way that questions the correctness 
of the case outcome? 
This type of contextual understanding of cases requires changes in the 
materials used to teach our students. The quality of a course is mostly 
dependent on the quality of the instructor, but is also dependent on the 
quality of the course materials. There are some very good casebooks, 
many more that are mediocre, and some that are outright awful. The 
awful casebooks simply string cases together, and the cases used may 
not be the most illustrative or fit the flow of the other cases for the area 
of law being examined; the “related materials” are spotty at best or 
almost non-existent; and the case questions lack creativity or are 
repeated throughout the book. Fortunately, most casebooks try to blend 
cases with other materials in rational ways. However, the mix of cases 
and related or explanatory materials is uneven, and the types of materials 
used can vary significantly. A Washington Law Review “Contracts 
Casebooks Survey” of contract law professors showed that “excessive 
length” and an “insufficient number of drafting exercises or problems” 
were the two most common criticisms of current casebooks.15 Another 
interesting finding is that “Personal Course Packets” were the third most 
common “casebook” used among the survey participants. This indicates 
a possible trend away from the extremely costly traditional casebook to a 
more multi-dimensional approach to teaching beyond the case method. 
The subject of contracts is an example of a subject where a narrative 
approach to teaching would be beneficial. Numerous theories of contract 
have been offered to explain—descriptively and normatively—the 
essence of contract law. In the end, a given theory at best explains part 
of contract law. Nonetheless, contract theory plays a vital role in helping 
to understand contract law and how best to reform its shortcomings. The 
advancement of a unitary theory of contract law, however, ignores the 
complexity and multiple functions of contracts. Cunningham correctly 
states that “the best way to account for the vast run of contract law 
doctrine is pragmatism—a search for what is useful to facilitate 
exchange transactions people should be free to pursue.”16 A pragmatic 
15. Wash. Law Review, Contracts Casebooks Survey Results 8 (Spring 2013) [hereinafter Wash. 
Law Review Survey Results] (on file with the Washington Law Review).  
16. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4, at 9 (citing Nate B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract 
Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 77 (2009)). 
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contract law, and pragmatic use of contract law, is premised by a certain 
degree of continuity, which a narrative approach can highlight, as well 
as the importance of context to give law meaning and to allow for its 
pragmatic application. 
Changes in methodological approaches to teaching law will require 
active engagement with faculty training opportunities. Neil Hamilton 
notes, “Faculty education will be essential to help each faculty member 
and the faculty as a whole to develop new curriculum and pedagogies 
that address the challenge. The faculty will need a willingness to 
experiment and to learn from trial and error in this new kind of 
teaching.”17 The mistake of traditional legal teaching that emphasized 
the use of the Socratic method in the presentation of the legal canon was 
that new professors were rarely schooled in the method and may never 
have experienced the teaching of it in the proper way; it was assumed 
that an intellectually gifted new hire would inherently be able to develop 
the technique without any training or guidance. This mistake must be 
avoided as law schools and law teachers experiment with new teaching 
methodologies. It should be acknowledged that many law professors 
have forsaken the Socratic method for general lecture and discussion 
formats, and some have taken the more ambitious problem-solving 
approach that confronts legal problems across different subject 
categories, but these approaches are mostly used in upper-level courses 
and seminars. The focus here is the shortcomings of current casebooks 
and the teaching of the first-year courses. The next two Parts look at the 
narrative power of law and the role of contextualism in modern contract 
law. 
II. NARRATIVE POWER OF THE LAW 
The law as storytelling and the pedagogical benefits of a narrative 
approach to teaching law has been vetted in legal scholarship.18 Robert 
17. Neil Hamilton, Law-Firm Competency Models and Student Professional Success: Building on 
a Foundation of Professional Formation/Professionalism 33 (Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 13-22, 2013) (citing William D. Henderson, A Blueprint 
for Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461, 502, 505 (2013); Neil Hamilton & Verna Monson, Legal 
Education’s Ethical Challenge: Empirical Research on How Most Effectively to Foster Each 
Student’s Professional Formation (Professionalism), 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 325, 384 (2011)), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2271410. 
18. See JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE (2002); DAVID RAY 
PAPKE, NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE: A READER IN STORYTELLING AND THE LAW 
(1991); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 971 (1991); Jane Baron, 
Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42 DUKE L.J. 630 (1993); Christine Metteer Lorillard, Stories 
that Make the Law Free: Literature as a Bridge Between Law and the Culture in Which it Must 
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Cover famously stated: “No set of legal institutions or prescriptions 
exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it 
meaning . . . . Once understood in the context of the narratives that 
give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be 
observed, but a world in which we live.”19 A narrative approach to 
teaching integrates the descriptive and normative dimensions of 
law. In the words of Cover, “[True knowledge] requires that one 
know not only the precepts, but also their connections to possible and 
plausible states of affairs. It requires that one integrate not only the 
‘is’ and the ‘ought,’ but the ‘is,’ the ‘ought,’ and the ‘what might 
be.’”20 
The narrative approach, imbued with a full range of contextual 
information, provides students with a better understanding of the law 
and how it can best be used in advancing the interests of their clients. It 
does this, to some extent, by converging the is and the ought of law. Karl 
Llewellyn and the legal realists saw the “is” of real world practice—
especially in the areas of contract and commercial law—as the “ought” 
of law. In framing the Uniform Commercial Code, Llewellyn used open 
textured rules, such as the reasonableness standard, to allow contextual 
evidence (trade usage, business customs) to refresh and inform the rules 
of commercial law with the narratives of contract law-in-action.21 “It is 
in these narratives of commercial life where the meanings of contract 
rules are located.”22 All legal and normative rules are found in the 
contextual narrative that supplies them “with history and destiny, 
Exist, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 251 (2005); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and 
the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989) (arguing that legal 
storytelling will make the law more empathetic to individuals and diversity in legal process); 
Symposium, Pedagogy of Narrative, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1990). 
19. Robert M. Cover, Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4–5 (1983). 
20. Id. at 10. 
21. Article 2 uses the reasonableness standard over forty times. See, e.g.,  
U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (2012) (providing that the written-confirmation rule requires that the 
confirmation be sent “within a reasonable time”); id. § 2-201(3)(a) (providing that in order to 
qualify for the specially manufactured goods exception to the statute of frauds the seller must 
“reasonably indicate” that the goods in the process of manufacture are for the buyer); id. § 2-
206(1)(a) (providing that unless indicated otherwise in the offer, an acceptance may be sent in “any 
medium reasonable in the circumstances”); id. § 2-206(2) (providing that the beginning of 
performance may be a “reasonable mode” of acceptance, but an “offeror who is not notified within a 
reasonable time may treat the offer as having lapsed”); id. § 2-207(1) (providing that a statement of 
acceptance must be “sent within a reasonable time”); id. § 2-209(5) (providing that a party who 
waived a right under a contract “may retract the waiver by reasonable notification”). 
22. Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track Theory of Interpretation, 109 PENN. 
ST. L. REV. 397, 484 (2004). 
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beginning and end, explanation and purpose.”23 
Llewellyn’s “ought as is” equation noted above is subject to attack. 
An astute lawyer can argue in favor of a normative alternative that exists 
beyond actual commercial practice. The lawyer presents an alternative 
narrative in which commercial practice is portrayed as something other 
than what the law should entail—that is, the lawyer’s argument is that 
the judge should interpret a legal rule or a contract based upon a vision 
as to what practice should be. The lawyer argues that existing usage or 
practice is actually bad or inefficient and that the court should interpret 
the law in a way to encourage the development of a good commercial 
practice. The conversion of the “is” of real world practice to the “ought” 
of contract rules is used to determine the meaning of the parties’ 
agreement. However, using Cover’s concept of “what might be,” the 
court can use contract law’s regulatory function—represented by such 
meta-principles as good faith, commercial reasonableness, and 
unconscionability—to restructure the “is” to the “what might be.”24 The 
continuing exploration and recognition of the “is” allows the rules and 
principles of the law to become self-revising. However, in refreshing 
rules through the recognition of modern practice, the courts at the same 
time can modify the “is” through the application of an alternative 
normative narrative. 
In learning law and its many nuances, students also need to learn how 
to apply its rules “to new contexts.”25 These contexts include the stories 
brought to the practicing lawyer by their clients. “[L]awyers practice 
their craft, listening to the stories of clients, refashioning and refitting 
the stories they hear (or the stories they imagine they hear) to fit the 
language of the law and to accommodate what might be called the ‘law 
culture’ story.”26 
Teaching a narrative view of case law better prepares students to 
respond to their client stories, for it shows law as something more than 
being “inert, limited, and formal.”27 James Elkins writes: 
23. Id. (quoting Cover, supra note 19, at 5). 
24. Cover, supra note 19, at 10 (“To live in a legal world requires that one know not only the 
precepts, but also their connections to possible and plausible states of affairs. It requires that one 
integrate not only the ‘is’ and the ‘ought,’ but . . . the ‘what might be.’”). Another example of the 
merger of “is” and “ought” is what Richard Parker refers to as “prescriptive-descriptive tenets.” See 
Richard D. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory—And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 240 
(1981). 
25. Cassidy, supra note 9, at 1520. 
26. James R. Elkins, From the Symposium Editor, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 1 (1990); see also Leigh 
Buchanan Bienen, The Law as Storyteller, 98 HARV. L. REV. 494 (1984) (book review). 
27. David O. Friedrichs, Narrative Jurisprudence and Other Heresies: Legal Education at the 
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[Law as narrative] is more than the telling or listening aspect of 
the craft of lawyering that makes narrative (and the perspective 
it affords us) of interest to lawyers. When we think of law as 
narrative we think of law differently than we do when we 
conceive of law as a system of rules or as an adversarial contest 
or game. Law may indeed be a system of rules, a means of 
conflict resolution, a game, a form of rhetoric and argument, or a 
discourse, but it is also a vast reservoir of stories—stories about 
how we use law and how we come to believe in its necessity.28 
The use of narrative or storytelling to understand law has been around 
for some time. However, it is primarily seen at work as a research 
methodology in areas such as feminist jurisprudence29 and law as 
interpretation.30 Contracts in the Real World attempts to use stories from 
canonic and modern cases to tell the story of law in action.31 
What are the potential benefits to this type of narrative approach to 
the teaching of law? First, connecting old cases, many considered 
canonical, with recent cases shows the continuity of law. In fact, the new 
cases bring the old cases to life; students see their immediate relevancy 
to the modern world. The instructor can explore factual differences that 
may be used to distinguish the cases or to show that despite such 
differences the rule or exception still holds true today. 
Second, this intergenerational analysis can also be used to note the 
inherent flexibility of legal concepts that have been around for centuries 
but continue to find new areas of application. A few legal concepts that 
come to mind include the concepts of trust and agency, and the evolution 
of fiduciary duties in business organizations out of those two earlier 
Margin, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 18 (1990). 
28. Elkins, supra note 26, at 1. 
29. See Felice Batlan, Engendering Legal History, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 823 (2005); Mary 
Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract Law, 140 
U. PA. L. REV. 1029 (1992); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, The Gendered Curriculum: Of Contracts and 
Careers, 77 IOWA L. REV. 55 (1991); Debora L. Threedy, Feminists and Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. 
L. REV. 1247 (1999). For an analysis of gender in casebooks, see Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading 
Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1985), and 
Angela Fernandez, An Object Lesson in Speculation: Multiple Views of the Cathedral in Leaf v. 
International Galleries, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 481, 503–14 (2008) (discussing how a case becomes 
canonized in a casebook). 
30. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975) [hereinafter Dworkin, 
Hard Cases]; Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527 (1982) [hereinafter 
Dworkin, Law as Interpretation]; Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 
(1982). 
31. See Joanna Benjamin, The Narratives of Financial Law, 30 O.J.L.S. 787 (2010); Catherine 
Mitchell, Narrativising Contract Law, 29 LEGAL STUD. 19 (2009).  
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concepts.32 The evolution of the internet, the creation of new types of 
informational products, and the idea that the license is the product 
provide other examples. These new “things” raised the question of 
whether a new body of law or government regulation was needed. In the 
end, except for some minor tinkering, “old” law was determined to be 
adequate to facilitate and regulate these new technologies and 
products.33 For example, the ancient doctrines of trespass and nuisance 
have been employed to police inappropriate use of Internet Service 
Provider’s bandwidth.34 
Third, it is important to take the student’s perspective in developing 
teaching methodologies—different students respond better to different 
methodologies. Narrative or story-telling should be one of a number of 
teaching methodologies used to reach the different learning propensities 
of students. Beyond the excitement and trepidation of the first semester 
of law school, the benefits of the Socratic and case method have run 
their course and hopefully served the purpose of sharpening critical 
32. Directors and officers are agents by the fact of being employed by the corporation. But 
historically, corporate law evolved from trust law. Deborah DeMott states: “Not surprisingly, the 
corporate form of business organization proved to be fertile ground for application and development 
of fiduciary principles. A corporation’s directors occupy a trustee-like position . . . .” Deborah A. 
DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 880 
(emphasis in original); see also Adolph A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. 
L. REV. 1049 (1931); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
33. The rise of electronic transactions and information products led to some attempts to create a 
comprehensive law to regulate the internet and the licensing of informational products. The most 
important attempt was the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 2B (Licensing). 
Article 2B was initially sponsored by the American Law Institute (ALI) and the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), the two organizations that are 
the traditional sponsors of the UCC and revisions to the UCC. However, NCCUSL eventually 
dropped its sponsorship and Article 2B was withdrawn. The ALI tried again by drafting a model 
law—Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA), but the UCITA was a failure as 
Maryland and Virginia were the only states to adopt the law. See A. Michael Froomkin, Article 2B 
as Legal Software for Electronic Contracting—Operating System or Trojan Horse?, 13 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1023, 1024 (1998) (arguing that states have managed electronic contracting well with 
“few legal crashes”); Nim Razook, The Politics and Promise of UCITA, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
643, 643–44 (2003) (“[T]he [UCITA] has weathered the pull-out by the American Law Institute’s 
contributing drafters’ concerted and well-organized efforts to contest its passage and a very cold 
reception by the states.”) (footnotes omitted); Katy Hull, Note, The Overlooked Concern with the 
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1391, 1391–92 (2000) (arguing 
that case law can adapt better to the rapidly changing technology that UCITA seeks to govern). 
34. For cases that apply trespass doctrine to the internet, see eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 
F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000), aff’d, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004); America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. 
Va. 1998); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003). For a discussion of applying nuisance 
law to the internet, see Michael J. Gray, Applying Nuisance Law to Internet Obscenity, 6 I/S: J.L. & 
POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 317 (2010). 
 
                                                     
09 - DiMatteo Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2013  2:12 PM 
2013] CONTRACT STORIES 1299 
thinking skills. But something more is needed to keep students’ attention 
and broaden their search for operative facts and issues. One scholar asks: 
“How can law schools help to vitally engage their students and lay the 
groundwork for similar vital engagement in their studies and ultimately 
their law practice?”35 
If the analogy of case law’s development as a “chain novel”36 is an 
overstatement, it is at least a loose-leaf binder, organized by tabs into 
different bodies or subjects of law—from general principles to 
specialized bodies of rules.37 Within each generic tab are many sub-tabs 
of the individual rules, exceptions, and factors used in the application of 
law to fact patterns of similarly situated cases. Common law reasoning 
by its very nature is a narrative undertaking. It must look back to find 
exemplary precedent—this is required for the court to demonstrate its 
use of authoritative sources to bolster claims of objectivity, impartiality, 
and the quality of its deductive reasoning. At the same time, the case 
before the court has at least some level of particularity that separates it 
from pre-existing case law. The court also must search for any such 
particularity in the legal precedent. Finally, depending on the type of 
particularity, the court may feel it prudent to project that particularity or 
uniqueness into the future to provide guidance to future courts. The court 
often poses hypotheticals to flesh out likely future developments of the 
law.38 
35. R. Lisle Baker & Daniel P. Brown, On Engagement: Learning to Pay Attention 6 (Suffolk 
Univ. Law Sch., Research Paper No. 13−15, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2269726. 
36. See Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 30; Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, supra note 30. 
The concept of law as a chain novel depicts the law as chapters in a book with a different author for 
each chapter. In a new case, a judge looks at the legal precedents as if they were chapters in a novel 
and her job is to write the next chapter. The judge has some discretion as to how she writes the new 
chapter, but is constrained by the storyline of the previous chapters. For example, if the earlier 
chapters are in the genre of a traditional murder-mystery, the judge is not free to write a chapter 
related to the genre of science fiction. 
37. Robert Hillman and Nate Oman debated the benefits and costs of general and specialized 
bodies of law focusing on contract law. See Robert A. Hillman, Contract Law in Context: The Case 
of Software Contracts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 669 (2010); Nathan B. Oman, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of God’s Law: Islamic Mahr Contracts and the Perils of Legal Specialization, 45 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 579 (2010). 
38. Karl Llewellyn listed sixty-four techniques that courts use in dealing with precedent and in 
deciding cases. Two of the techniques included forward-looking reasoning based upon “prophecy” 
(hypotheticals): “63. (Anticipatory): The deliberate forward-prophecy [and] 64. (Anticipatory): The 
deliberate hedge via an alternative which can, on call, render the main ruling ‘mere dictum.’” KARL 
N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 91 (1960) (citing Harris v. 
Shorall, 130 N.E. 572 (N.Y. 1921)). Neil Duxbury notes: “Common-law courts . . . recognize that 
hypothetical instances can be instructive and compelling . . . .” NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND 
AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 3 (2008). Courts in dicta often pose hypothetical situations that are not 
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This narrative is both internal and external to the law. The 
exemplarity of cited case law, as explored by the case method, exposes 
law students to the conceptual nature of law in which deductive 
reasoning is used to get students to think like a lawyer. The student 
learns the roles of rules, standards, and principles, and under a gifted 
professor, they learn the underlying rationales and public policy behind 
these various legal norms. But much more has to be learned—why some 
areas of law are rule-dominated and others are standard-dominated; how 
a chaotic rules-based regime is sometimes replaced by a standards 
regime to bring order to the chaos; how standards’ application to a wide 
range of variant cases leads to the development of exceptions or a 
categorization of the case law into groups of similarly situated cases, 
transforming the standard into a rules-based regime; the ability to 
distinguish cases on behalf of a client no matter how minute the 
differences in the cases; and so forth. 
The formal rules of the law are only part of the narrative enterprise. 
The rules always need to be placed in the factual context of a given case. 
This is the area of law application—rule to fact. Here the narrative 
comes from outside of the law; in many instances, the law looks to the 
real world of practice to infuse a rule with meaning or to guide the court 
in applying the law to the case at bar. Commercial law, especially the 
law of sales, looks to business practice—the stories of merchants and 
how their businesses, industries, and associations have evolved in order 
to conduct business based on elements of efficiency, certainty, trust, and 
professionalism.39 
Contracts in the Real World demonstrates that the adages of contract 
law mask the underlying complexity of rule application, of competing 
policy considerations, and the importance of context. Two examples 
from the book will be used here to show how a narrative approach 
reveals the underlying elements of formal contract doctrine. The two 
examples are the objective theory of contracts and the roles of the 
Statute of Frauds, plain meaning rule, and parol evidence rule in contract 
presented in the case. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 953, 1037 (1990). 
39. Section 103(a)(2) of the UCC states that one of the UCC’s underlying purposes is “to permit 
the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the 
parties.” U.C.C. § 1-103 (2012). Section 202 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, entitled 
“Rules in Aid of Interpretation,” states that “any course of performance . . . is given great weight in 
the interpretation of the agreement.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(4) (1981). It 
also states: “When reasonable, the manifestations of intention of the parties . . . [should be] 
interpreted as consistent . . . with any relevant course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of 
trade.” Id. § 202(5). 
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interpretation. 
Contracts in the Real World shows how a narrative structure in telling 
the story of contract law can be done succinctly. In 212 pages, it weaves 
old cases and sensational new ones to place contract law in its historical 
context and, at the same time, make the relevancy of its rules to modern 
transactions apparent to the student. Cunningham covers the traditional 
topics of contract law: contract formation (gift promises vs. enforceable 
contracts, invitations to offer vs. offer, acceptance, mutual assent);40 
illegal contracts (unconscionability, familial relations, gambling, 
surrogacy agreements);41 performance (express and implied terms, duty 
of good faith, unanticipated circumstances, modification, accord and 
satisfaction);42 breach and substantial performance;43 remedies 
(compensatory damages, mitigation, liquidated damages, specific 
performance);44 contract interpretation, Statute of Frauds, and parol 
evidence;45 restitution and unjust enrichment;46 third-party beneficiaries 
and assignment;47 and tortious interference.48 
In addition, Cunningham uses many of contract law’s iconic cases, 
including Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico;49 Allegheny College v. 
National Chautauqua County Bank;50 Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball 
Co.;51 Hadley v. Baxendale;52 Hawkins v. McGee;53 Hotchkiss v. 
National City Bank of New York;54 Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent;55 Krell 
v. Henry;56 Lucy v. Zehmer;57 Marvin v. Marvin;58 Masterson v. Sine;59 
40. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4, at 11–34. 
41. Id. at 35–58. 
42. Id. at 148–71. 
43. Id. at 181–82, 186–93. 
44. Id. at 84–108. 
45. Id. at 126–47. 
46. Id. at 109–25. 
47. Id. at 194–202. 
48. Id. at 202–05. 
49. 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). 
50. 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927). 
51. (1893) 1 Q.B. 256 (C.A.) (Eng.). 
52. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145; 9 Ex. 341. 
53. 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929). 
54. 200 F. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). 
55. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). 
56. (1903) 2 K.B. 740 (Eng.). 
57. 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954). 
58. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1960). 
59. 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). 
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Matter of Baby M;60 Mitchill v. Lath;61 Newman v. Schiff;62 Pacific Gas 
v. G.W. Thomas Drayage;63 Paradine v. Jane;64 Parker v. Twentieth 
Century Fox;65 Peevyhouse v. Garland & Co.;66 ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg;67 Raffles v. Wichelhaus;68 Sherwood v. Walker;69 Taylor v. 
Caldwell;70 and Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon.71 These older 
canonical cases are woven together with modern cases, many featuring 
celebrity disputants.72 Cunningham’s stories demonstrate the continuity 
and incredible flexibility that contract law brings to bear on modern 
contract disputes. He demonstrates that contract law is more than mere 
doctrine but is a vibrant, living law. The student is made aware of the 
importance of contract law in daily practice. 
In the end, the narrative approach, as a technique of teaching legal 
reasoning, is captured by the terms exemplarity and typicality or a-
typicality. Legal philosopher Maksymilian Del Mar describes 
exemplarity as follows: 
[F]or the purposes of analysing legal reasoning, exemplarity is 
profitably understood as a complex concept with the following 
dimensions: first, typicality; second, a-typicality; and third, 
modelling for the future. These dimensions can also be usefully 
thought of in temporal terms: typicality is backward-looking, a-
typicality is present-regarding and modelling is future-oriented. 
Any instance of exemplarity delicately balances these 
dimensions. This is equally so for any legal reasoning process, 
which must balance respect for the particularity of the present 
case, with respect for relevant past decisions and respect for the 
60. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
61. 160 N.E. 646 (N.Y. 1928). 
62. 778 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1985). 
63. 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968). 
64. (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B.); Alyen 26. 
65. 474 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1970). 
66. 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962). 
67. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
68. (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch.); 2 Hurl. & C. 906. 
69. 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887). 
70. (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B.); 3 B. & S. 826. 
71. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). 
72. See, e.g., In re Marriage of McCourt, No. BD514309, 2010 WL 5092780 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 7, 2010). In this case, a husband and wife disputed ownership of the Los Angeles Dodgers, 
where there were two sets of original post-nuptial agreements—one set giving the Dodgers to the 
husband, and the other set splitting ownership of the Dodgers between the husband and wife. Id. 
 
                                                     
09 - DiMatteo Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2013  2:12 PM 
2013] CONTRACT STORIES 1303 
way in which the case might be used by future courts . . . .73 
Del Mar asserts that the best method for demonstrating the continuity 
of law, at least in its idealized version, is through a narrative accounting. 
Contracts in the Real World represents a general approach to teaching 
law under Del Mar’s exemplarity-narrativity analysis. First, common-
law reasoning is “full of exemplarity and narrativity,”74 in which cases 
are tied to the past (narrativity) and also distinguished from prior cases 
(exemplarity). Second, such reasoning “combine[s] narrativity with 
exemplarity” and by doing so creates “a temporally-organised matrix of 
happenings,”75 reaching into the past, dealing with the present, and 
looking to the future, “that resonates emotionally with the audience.”76 
Narrative helps the student probe deeper into the indeterminacy of 
law: 
[T]he concept of exemplarity is bound to experience some 
dialectical vertigo: thinking of the typicality of an example, one 
cannot but help to think of its a-typicality (for why was that 
sample chosen, and not another), and in thinking of its a-
typicality, one cannot but help to think of its normativity (for 
was it not chosen not only because it is unique, but also because 
it is unique in some positive way?).77 
A selection of a case for inclusion in casebook, whether universally 
accepted as being canonical (e.g., Hadley v. Baxendale,78 Hawkins v. 
McGee,79 and Raffles v. Wichelhaus80) or merely as one of many cases 
that could be selected, is meant to exemplify or illustrate a rule or 
principle of law. At the same time, a case that is treated as an exemplar 
is also unique or a-typical because in some way it stands out against the 
rest. The very nature of choice also implicates a normative dimension—
the case is meant to point the student in the right direction, to provide 
guidance as to how future cases should be decided.81 
73. Maksymilian Del Mar, Exemplarity and Narrativity in the Common Law Tradition: Exploring 
Williams v. Roffey 1, (Queen Mary Univ. of London, Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 139/2013, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2247937. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 2. 
78. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145; 9 Ex. 341. 
79. 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929). 
80. (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch.); 2 Hurl. & C. 906. 
81. Cunningham’s discussion of a famous Cardozo decision shows the competing notions of 
typicality and a-typicality. The case involved a “typical” construction contract dispute in which an 
owner-buyer withholds final payment due to a defect in construction. The doctrinal answer was 
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The exemplarity of a given case—its typicality and a-typicality—
allows the instructor to build a narrative structure tying the case to the 
earlier cases. In any new case, the professor, lawyer, or judge seeks to tie 
their arguments and opinions to an ongoing legal narrative that is at the 
center of the evolution of common law rules. This is the essence of 
common law reasoning. The typicality and a-typicality of cases allows 
attorneys on opposing sides to cite the same case law and pose 
diametrically opposed arguments: one emphasizes the case’s typicality 
(mandatory precedent), while the other stresses its a-typicality 
(distinguishing). 
The narrative approach also allows the particularization of law’s 
generality. Broad principles, vague standards, as well as fixed and open-
ended rules, can be shown at work in the particular facts of a case. Even 
more, in telling a story of the use of the principle, standard or rule in a 
series of cases, the characteristics of choice, nuance, and creativity are 
exposed in the law. The dialectical relationship between generality and 
concreteness can be shown in telling a story beginning with the general 
rule—seeing its applications to different fact scenarios, seeing the 
tension of general principle or rule and novel facts, the crafting of an 
application, and the creation of exceptions. It demonstrates the duality of 
law to fact and fact to law—the law imposing its will on a case based 
upon precedent, certainty, and predictability; the case at bar and the 
particularity of its facts influence how the law should be applied and 
how it should be changed. 
In Contracts in the Real World, Cunningham shows the dialectical 
relationship between rule and fact, and, more broadly, between law and 
context. At the same time he demonstrates the ability of the narrative 
approach to cover complicated areas of law with great brevity of text. In 
twenty-two short pages he covers the story of the statute of frauds and 
parol evidence rule, as well as their roles in contract interpretation.82 
Many of the cases used are very recent cases involving celebrities and 
sensational fact patterns. The cases feature the rap artist Eminem,83 
newsman Dan Rather,84 a case relating to the production of the Golden 
clear that since the contractor had not fully performed the final payment was not yet due. Cardozo 
focused on the a-typicality of the case—use of an unspecified brand of pipe of equal quality and the 
lack of real damages to the owner-buyer—to fabricate the substantial performance doctrine. 
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4, at 189 (discussing Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 
1921)). 
82. Id. at 126–47. 
83. F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010). 
84. Rather v. CBS Corp., 886 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). 
 
                                                     
09 - DiMatteo Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2013  2:12 PM 
2013] CONTRACT STORIES 1305 
Globe Awards,85 the McCourts’ divorce battle that determined the fate 
of the Los Angeles Dodgers,86 country music personality Cliff Dumas,87 
Academy Award-winning actress Jane Fonda,88 and the cosmetics icon 
Elizabeth Arden.89 
Cunningham covers much ground in a little space, laying out the 
classic rules of contract, as well as showing the disunity in the 
application of the rules to similar fact patterns across different states. We 
learn that the statute of frauds traces its origin to 1677 and that the 
rationales for its invention have long passed.90 Still, the rule requiring a 
written instrument to enforce certain contracts persists to the present.91 
We learn that when a writing, whether required by the statute of frauds 
or not, is intended to be the final integration of the parties’ agreement, 
then the parol evidence rule precludes the use of extrinsic evidence to 
supplement the contract (although the word “contradict” the contract 
may be a better choice).92 The judge applies the plain meaning rule to 
interpret the contract unless she decides the contract is ambiguous.93 If 
the judge decides the latter, the jury decides the interpretation as a matter 
of fact with the aid of extrinsic evidence presented by the parties.94 
In deciding the existence of an ambiguity, Cunningham gives the 
modern standard of “whether the language is reasonably susceptible 
to . . . competing interpretations . . . .”95 However, the narrative story is a 
bit incomplete. It would have been wise to advise the student of the 
practicality of this standard. It provides a great deal of discretion to the 
court. In the event that a “plain meaning” interpretation would lead to an 
unjust or ludicrous outcome, courts will be tempted to allow extrinsic 
evidence to be admitted for the court to determine if there is a reasonable 
85. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4, at 132–36 (discussing how Dick Clark Productions contested the 
termination of its rights to produce the Golden Globe Awards show by claiming that the contract 
provided for automatic renewals). 
86. In re Marriage of McCourt, No. BD514309, 2010 WL 5092780 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2010) 
(addressing claims by a husband and a wife for ownership or shared ownership of the Los Angeles 
Dodgers due to conflicting language in their postnuptial agreement). 
87. Dumas v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 416 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2005). 
88. Rosenthal v. Fonda, 862 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1988). 
89. Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 110 N.E.2d 551 (N.Y. 1953). 
90. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4, at 142. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 134–35. 
93. Id. at 127–29, 146. 
94. Id. at 127. 
95. Id. 
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alternative interpretation (opposed to the plain meaning interpretation).96 
If the court recognizes the plausibility of the alternative meaning, then it 
can declare an ambiguity, switching the determination from one of law 
to one of fact. 
In regard to the Eminem case, Cunningham explains the importance 
of “linguistic structure and cues” in determining whether the purchase of 
downloads and ringtones were sales for which the royalty rate was fixed 
at twenty percent or licenses for which Eminem would receive a royalty 
rate of fifty percent.97 Here the appellate court focused on the prefatory 
language of the license provision that followed the sales provision that 
stated “[n]otwithstanding the foregoing.”98 It interpreted that to mean 
that in cases of doubt the residual category was a license, and thus held 
that Eminem was entitled to the fifty percent royalty rate. The moral of 
the story is two-fold. First, in complex contracts legal cues, like 
“notwithstanding,” are ways of signaling the more important or broader 
terms. Second, the case shows the importance of “think[ing] through 
plausible future scenarios” in the drafting of long-term contracts.99 
In the Rather case, the issue was conflicting terms between an original 
contract and an amendment to that contract.100 The original contract had 
a “pay-or-play” clause that gave the broadcasting company the option of 
paying Rather, not using his services, and not being required to release 
him from the contract in order to work for another network. The 
amendment indicated that if released from his news anchor position the 
network was required to place him in another specified show (a removal-
and-reassignment clause). The court held that since the later clause was 
preceded by the phrase, “except as otherwise provided in this 
contract,”101 the pay-or-play clause controlled. Cunningham implicitly 
makes the point that this was a case of poor contract drafting. The 
lawyer, in negotiating the amendment, should have cross-referenced the 
pay-or-play clause and made sure that the removal-and-reassignment 
clause was replacing the previous clause. 
In the Golden Globe case, the dispute pertained to the renewal of the 
right to produce the awards show.102 The production company argued 
96. Id. at 127–29, 146. 
97. Id. at 129 (discussing F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 
2010)). 
98. Id. at 128. 
99. Id. at 129. 
100. Id. at 130–32 (discussing Rather v. CBS Corp., 886 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)). 
101. Id. at 132. 
102. Id. at 132–36. 
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that the contract granted them the right to an unlimited number of 
options to produce the show. The contract, meant to be a final 
integration, required the court to directly interpret the meaning of the 
clause and precluded it from using extrinsic evidence by the parol 
evidence rule. Despite the existence of a commonly used merger clause, 
the court held that a traditional principle of contract interpretation is that 
individual terms are to be interpreted in the context of the contract as a 
whole. The “open-ended” renewal clause was preceded by a clause that 
granted the producer eight options. The court reasoned that if the second 
clause granted unlimited options then there would be no reason for the 
first clause’s stipulating a fixed number of options. The court also noted 
that the parol evidence rule did not bar the admission of course of 
performance or post-contract evidence. The facts showed the producer 
always formally requested a renewal and received the express consent of 
the owner of the show and thus supported the argument that the options 
were not automatic or unlimited.103 
The McCourt case involved a post-nuptial agreement dividing the 
couple’s property, but the agreement left unclear who was to be 
allocated the ownership of the Los Angeles Dodgers.104 A number of the 
original copies of the contract stipulated that the team went to the 
husband, while other copies equally divided the ownership between the 
husband and wife. Cunningham describes this case as one of a 
“scrivener’s error” and references two older cases—the case of the 
“fraudulent architect”105 and the 1941 case of the “erroneous deed.”106 In 
the fraudulent architect case, two contracts were prepared with vastly 
different contract prices.107 However, the case was distinguishable 
because the divergence was intentionally caused by the architect in order 
to fraudulently induce the parties to enter the contract. The McCourt 
case involved a drafting error, but no fraud. In the erroneous deed case, a 
deed was drafted describing the transfer of an entire parcel of land, while 
the parties had agreed on a sale of only a portion of the parcel. The court 
held that the case was one of mutual mistake, and not one simply caused 
by a scrivener’s error and, therefore, the normal remedy for scrivener’s 
error—the remedy of reformation—was not applicable.108 In the end, the 
court in the McCourt case held that its case was also distinguishable 
103. Id. at 136. 
104. Id. at 136–41. 
105. Id. at 138–39. 
106. Id. at 139–40. 
107. Id. at 138. 
108. Id. at 140. 
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from the scrivener’s error cases, since there was conflicting evidence of 
what the parties actually intended.109 Therefore, the contract was held to 
be unenforceable with resolution to be decided under divorce law.110 
The notion that law is an exact science was implicitly dismissed in the 
above cases that demonstrated the practice of distinguishing cases. The 
Dumas case111 notes that courts use the reasons behind rules as guides to 
rule application.112 It further illustrates the problem of applying a rule 
when the reasons for the rule have run out. The classic example is the 
statute of frauds, created in 1677, requiring a written instrument in 
certain types of contract transactions. The Dumas case dealt with the 
negotiation of a five-year employment contract via a series of e-mail 
exchanges. In the end, the court held that the exchange of e-mails did not 
satisfy the statute of frauds. However, this is a weak case for illustrating 
the need to use “horse sense” in applying the statute because the court 
held that no contract was formed due to indefiniteness, meaning that the 
statute of frauds issue was irrelevant to the decision.113 
The Jane Fonda114 and Elizabeth Arden115 cases illustrate the lack of 
unity in the area of the statute of frauds. In general, courts have loosened 
the rigidity of its requirements in order to avoid dismissing meritorious 
claims. However, what the statute actually requires varies across the 
states. Most states do not require the agreement to be a single document, 
and instead most states allow the writing and signature requirements to 
be met by piecing together numerous documents.116 However, some 
states require the documents to cross-reference each other, while other 
states do not.117 Cunningham summarizes the material presented in the 
109. Id. (“Testimony conflicted about [what] the couple intended . . . .”). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 141–42 (citing Dumas v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 416 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
112. Id. at 142 (“[C]ourts often look to a statute’s purpose or history.”). 
113. Id. (“Judges rely instead on horse sense.”). 
114. Id. at 142–44 (discussing Rosenthal v. Fonda, 862 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1988)).  
115. Id. at 144–45 (discussing Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 110 N.E.2d 551 (N.Y. 
1953)). 
116. See U.C.C. § 2–201(1) (2012) (providing that the statute of frauds is satisfied by “some 
writing”); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 784 (5th ed. 2003) (“If 
there is more than one record and all of the records are signed by the party to be charged and it is 
clear by their contents that they relate to the same transaction,” then the statute of frauds is satisfied; 
or if all are not signed then “extrinsic evidence is admissible to help show the connection between 
the documents and the assent of the party to be charged.”); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. 
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-4, 58 (2d ed. 1980) (“Presumably several writings 
can be pieced together to satisfy the requirement, writings which taken alone would not be 
sufficient.”). 
117. PERILLO, supra note 116, at 784 (noting that in some states, if the signed document is “not 
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Jane Fonda and Elizabeth Arden cases by tapping into the longstanding 
debate between those arguing for formal versus contextual methods of 
interpretation: “[I]t is hard to find a court that inflexibly adheres 
to . . . pure literalism or pure contextualism. Both strands influence the 
analysis and resolution of disputes over the meaning of words and the 
scope of documents.”118 Thus, the formalism of the rules relating to the 
statute of frauds are not as formalistically applied as they were in the 
past due to the shift to a contextual approach to interpretation and 
application of law. 
III. ASCENDANT CONTEXTUALISM: IMBUING LAW WITH 
MEANING 
It is repeatedly stated that we are all realists now. An equally apt 
statement is that we are all contextualists now!119 Despite the arguments 
of neo-formalists,120 law and legal reasoning is only a part of 
understanding how the legal process works in fact. Karl Llewellyn noted 
that in teaching law “it becomes vital in a new way to remember that the 
sound quest cannot be the simple-via-the-shallow; it must drive on 
despite all defeat toward the simple-via-the-deep.”121 Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr.’s oft-cited prediction theory122 recognizes that a successful 
lawyer requires something broader than just thinking like a lawyer or, 
alternatively stated, that the phrase “thinking like a lawyer” needs to be 
more broadly understood as something beyond legal reasoning or critical 
thinking. In Holmes’ words: “The object of our study, then, is 
prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force through 
attached to or does not expressly refer to the unsigned” document, then “the unsigned document is 
not sufficiently authenticated” (citing Young v. McQuerrey, 508 P.2d 1051 (Haw. 1973); Hoffman 
v. S.V., 628 P.2d 218 (Idaho 1981); Owen v. Hendricks, 433 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1968))). 
118. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4, at 147. 
119. The rise of contextual interpretation of law and legal instruments, likely accelerated by the 
adoption of the UCC, has shattered the idea that contracts or statutes can ever be bastions of plain 
meaning interpretation. See, e.g., Catherine Mitchell, Entire Agreement Clauses: Contracting out of 
Contextualism, 22 J. CONTRACT L. 222 (2006). 
120. See Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual 
Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023 (2009); John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of 
Neoformalism, 71 FORD. L. REV. 869 (2002); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory 
and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003); Robert E. Scott, A Case for Formalism 
in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847 (2000); Paul M. Secunda, Neoformalism and the 
Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Public Employment Law, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
907 (2011); William J. Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 
971. 
121. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 8. 
122. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
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the instrumentality of the courts.”123 The need to institute a more 
contextualized approach to teaching law was noted in a 1914 
Carnegie Foundation report “that recommended a more holistic and 
contextualized approach be taken in educating lawyers and 
preparing them for the practice of law.”124 A fuller understanding of 
context and its importance allows a lawyer a greater chance of 
predicting what the law and the courts will do. This ability enables 
the lawyer to better serve her clients. 
Contracts in the Real World continuously emphasizes context in 
teaching a deeper understanding of contract law and its application. 
A father’s gifting of the family home and a promise to pay off the 
mortgages encumbering the home in exchange for one dollar was a 
legal gift (handing over the deed), but the promise to pay off the 
mortgages was unenforceable because the “context of the event left 
no doubt the father was giving a gift” and not entering a contract.125 
In a case involving the borrowing of money in order to escape Nazi-
occupied Greece, the amount of the loan was in dispute, as well as 
whether the loan agreement was a forgery. The court held that the issue 
of forgery was secondary given the “context” of a desperate need to 
leave Greece and, therefore, mere inadequacy of the consideration did 
not void the contract.126 
The above two cases illustrate that “contracting parties inhabit two 
different worlds, a real one created by them and an artificial one created 
by the law.”127 Catherine Mitchell takes issue with the “two worlds” 
view of parties engaging in two separate transactions—the business and 
the legal transaction. She admits that law may, at times, diverge from 
real world practice, leaving contract doctrines with a veneer of 
“artificiality and irrelevance.”128 However, Mitchell asserts that even 
though such divergence may occur, “the connection between contractual 
relationships and contract law is much more complex and nuanced than 
the ‘two worlds’ idea suggests.”129 In the end, she argues that what is 
needed is a type of legal reasoning that recognizes “the operation of 
123. Id. at 457. 
124. DAVID I.C. THOMSON, LAW SCHOOL 2.0: LEGAL EDUCATION FOR A DIGITAL AGE 18 (2009). 
125. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4, at 40 (discussing Fischer v. Union Trust, 101 N.W. 852 (Mich. 
1904)). 
126. Id. at 39 (discussing Batsakis v. Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. App. 1949)). 
127. Catherine Mitchell, Contracts and Contract Law: Challenging the Distinction Between the 
‘Real’ and ‘Paper’ Deal, 29 O.J.L.S. 675, 676 (2009). 
128. Id. at 677 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
129. Id. 
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formal contracts and relational norms as integrated phenomena.”130 
While socio-legal scholars differ over the precise implications of 
relational theory for contract law and legal reasoning, most generally 
agree that a contextual approach to contracts regulation is preferred over 
an inflexible doctrinal method. Feinman, for example, states that 
relational analysis is “contextual with a vengeance,” requiring a 
pragmatic, differentiating approach depending on contract type.131 
“[C]ourts should recognize that the documents may serve a variety of 
purposes depending on contractual context and the quality of the parties’ 
relationship.”132 
The use of relational norms in the interpretation of contracts “requires 
not [just] the construction of the parties’ agreement, but the 
reconstruction of it—the reassembly of its constituent parts and the 
expectations and motivations, both documented and undocumented, that 
helped create it.”133 The use of relational norms in the interpretation 
process, especially in long-term contracts, can be justified because it is 
in the use of these norms and the contextual evidence needed to flesh 
them out that a court can best determine the expectations of the parties in 
the formation and performance of their contract. 
What are the elements of context that influence courts and are 
important to understand when learning about the law? There is no easy 
answer to this question because there are many dimensions of context—
the context of the dispute (characteristics of the parties and their 
transactions within a given relationship and industry); the context of the 
case within a greater societal, cultural, and economic environment; and 
the context of the case within pre-existing and future case law. Appellate 
cases provide some of the operative facts of the case, but not a full or 
complete factual accounting. The appellate opinion may touch upon 
some of the external societal forces at play in a given dispute, but often 
ignore many important underlying factors, such as discrimination, bias, 
and stereotyping.134 A narrative approach to teaching law provides an 
opportunity to weave in these heretofore forgotten or neglected 
130. Id. (emphasis in original). 
131. Jay Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 737–38, 742 
(2000). 
132. Mitchell, supra note 127, at 702.  
133. Id. 
134. The issue of social-class bias has been examined by Miriam Cherry. See Miriam A. Cherry, 
Exploring (Social) Class in the Classroom: The Case of Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 28 PACE L. REV. 
235, 240–45 (2008) (discussing Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 
1964); Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); In re Baby M, 537 
A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891)). 
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contextual elements. 
Many of the key facts and influences in a case are not found in 
excerpted appellate court cases; they are found in the nitty-gritty of trial 
court materials. This was demonstrated in a 2008 symposium dedicated 
to better understanding the iconic 1917 case of Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon,135 the seminal case in which Justice Cardozo salvaged 
exclusive-agency contracts by implying a duty of best efforts on the 
agent in the procurement of endorsements for its principal.136 The case 
included Cardozo’s famous adage for the judicial authority to imply 
terms into such a contract (and others) where the promise is “‘instinct 
with an obligation,’ imperfectly expressed.”137 Deborah Zalesne takes 
issue with Cardozo’s opening characterization of Lady Duff-Gordon: 
“The defendant styles herself ‘a creator of fashions.’ Her favor helps a 
sale.”138 Zalesne notes that the characterization of Lady Duff-Gordon’s 
“business” is somewhat frivolous in nature.139 In fact, she was a savvy 
businessperson in a man’s world who helped shape the fashion world 
through the mass-marketing of designer clothing.140 The case could be 
used to show the nature of stereotyping and gender bias underlying the 
facts of the case or as they existed at the time of the case. 
The duty of best efforts is best rationalized as being dictated by the 
duty of good faith. Yet Nicholas Weiskopf notes that in researching the 
New York case law he found the courts rejecting good faith as a ground 
for the implication of terms.141 Thus, the case was not the watershed 
event that it could have been due to its narrow interpretation as simply 
implying a given duty in a unique form of contract—the exclusive-
agency contract. 
Miriam Cherry’s article illustrates how the Duff-Gordon case can be 
135. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). 
136. Symposium, The Enduring Legacy of Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 28 PACE L. REV. 
161 (2008). 
137. Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. at 214 (citing McCall Co. v. Wright, 117 N.Y.S. 775, 779 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1909)). 
138. Id. 
139. Deborah Zalesne with David Nadvorney, Integrating Academic Skills into First Year 
Curricula: Using Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon to Teach the Role of Facts in Legal Reasoning, 
28 PACE L. REV. 271, 290 (2008). 
140. Id. 
141. Nicholas R. Weiskopf, Wood v. Lucy: The Overlap Between Interpretation and Gap-Filling 
to Achieve Minimum Decencies, 28 PACE L. REV. 219, 220 (2008) (discussing how the New York 
Appellate Division reviewed the case law and in a 5–0 vote held there was not any good faith duty 
in the law that would allow the court to imply a duty into a contract, such as the duty to use best 
efforts). 
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used to place a case within its overall social context.142 In examining 
social class, she “open[s] [an] inquiry into the distributional nature of 
contract law” and encourages “students to think about issues of 
economic stratification more critically.”143 The richness of such cases or 
storylines is demonstrated by Celia Taylor’s article, Teaching Ethics in 
Context: Wood v. Lady, Lucy Duff-Gordon in the First Year 
Curriculum, which shows how the Duff-Gordon case can be used to 
teach professional ethics.144 Finally, a further example of the narrative-
contextual use of an iconic case to teach a deeper, more nuanced, and 
more realistic view of law and its application is Zalesne’s demonstration 
of how such cases are “ideal vehicles for explicit teaching of analytical 
skills.”145 He argues the importance of the broader use of such cases 
because of the current “disconnect” between doctrinal instruction and 
analytical skill training.146 
In prior scholarship, I have noted that Cardozo’s decision in Duff-
Gordon, like most of his opinions, demonstrated his contextual mode of 
interpretation.147 His ability to use context to look outside the immediate 
doctrinal formalities is what enabled him to profoundly change and 
modernize American contract and tort law. I argued that the implied duty 
of good faith already existed at the time of the Duff-Gordon case and 
that the case’s importance was due to its use of a contextual means of 
interpretation to construct the implied duty of best efforts.148 The 
importance of context, and not just reading formalized law, to the actual 
practice of law needs to be more fully emphasized in casebooks. The 
narrative approach is one means of capturing such all-important context. 
Duff-Gordon’s extension to modern developments in employment law 
provides an example of the importance of context in creating a story of 
law; it also shows the interconnectedness and discontinuities of law. 
142. See Cherry, supra note 134. 
143. James J. Fishman, The Enduring Legacy of Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 28 PACE L. 
REV. 162, 175 (2008). 
144. Celia R. Taylor, Teaching Ethics in Context: Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon in the First 
Year Curriculum, 28 PACE L. REV. 249, 249–50 (2008). 
145. Fishman, supra note 143, at 175. 
146. Id. 
147. Larry A. DiMatteo, Cardozo, Anti-Formalism, and the Fiction of Noninterventionism, 28 
PACE L. REV. 315, 340–44 (2008) (reviewing Cardozo’s use of extrinsic or contextual evidence in 
interpreting contracts). 
148. Id. at 318–24 (discussing the unoriginality of Cardozo’s decision in Duff-Gordon). 
Cardozo’s rejection of the four-corners analysis of formalism in favor of the use of context evidence 
is borne out by his assertion that “[w]e are not to suppose that one party was to be placed at the 
mercy of the other.” See Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917). 
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Robert Bird examines the application of “instinct with an obligation” as 
a rationale for extending the duty of good faith into the employment 
relationship.149 Along the same lines, Emily Gold Waldman criticizes 
the New York courts for failing to extend the implied duty of good faith 
into the employment context.150 In the end, the symposium on Duff-
Gordon shows that “[w]e should teach . . . fewer cases and do more with 
the cases we teach and use other methods for conveying doctrine.”151 Or, 
as another contract law professor states: “Depth is more important than 
breadth . . . . [L]earning how to extract from an opinion a coherent story 
of what happened in the case and understanding how the court applied 
legal doctrine to the facts . . . are far more important than obsessing 
about doctrine as such.”152 
A type of legal scholarship that emphasizes the role of depth over 
breadth is legal archeology. Legal archeology attempts to fill in the gaps 
in the official appellate court opinion. It places a case (usually an older, 
iconic one) in the context of the times. It explores evidence that was 
unreported in the formal decisions and places the case in the context of 
similarly situated cases. A fine example of this type of scholarship is 
Debora Threedy’s Dancing Around Gender: Lessons from Arthur 
Murray on Gender and Contracts.153 Threedy weaves a narrative of the 
role of gender stereotypes in one of contract law’s most iconic series of 
cases—the Arthur Murray dance studio cases.154 My first-year contract 
casebooks include an Arthur Murray case used to introduce the doctrine 
of undue influence. I find it interesting that some thirty-four years later 
the case remains vivid in my memory. In thinking about the present 
Article, the answer for this retention now seems clear—the case simply 
told a good story. But, as Threedy shows, it did not tell the correct or, at 
the least, the complete story.155 A further discussion of Threedy’s 
149. Robert C. Bird, An Employment Contract ‘Instinct with an Obligation’: Good Faith Costs 
and Contexts, 28 PACE L. REV. 409 (2008). 
150. Emily Gold Waldman, Fulfilling Lucy’s Legacy: Recognizing Implicit Good-Faith 
Obligations Within Explicit Job Duties, 28 PACE L. REV. 429 (2008). 
151. Wash. Law Review Survey Results, supra note 15, at 11. 
152. Id. at 16. 
153. Debora L. Threedy, Dancing Around Gender: Lessons from Arthur Murray on Gender and 
Contracts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 749 (2010). 
154. See Staples v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 61 Cal Rptr. 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Vokes v. Arthur 
Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Parker v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 295 N.E.2d 
487 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973). 
155. The cases found in the casebooks depict lonely, elderly women as victims of overreaching 
by male dance instructors leading them to be unduly influenced in purchasing a large number of 
dance lessons. See RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 991 (4th ed. 2008); 
CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 557 (6th ed. 
 
                                                     
 
09 - DiMatteo Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2013  2:12 PM 
2013] CONTRACT STORIES 1315 
analysis provides numerous insights into the law as applied and on how 
it should be taught. 
Threedy researched a significant number of old Arthur Murray dance 
studio cases and came upon a stunning realization that a number of the 
cases involved not only elderly women but also elderly men. Based upon 
this realization, she analyzed the different characterizations of the 
plaintiffs by the courts based on gender and, in some cases, the reaching 
of different outcomes in cases of almost identical fact patterns.156 
Unknown to law students, and subsequent practitioners, gender played a 
key role in the application of contract doctrine in these cases. The 
widowed old women were hoodwinked in buying an exorbitant number 
of dance lessons. The women were victims of overreaching as the studio 
used attractive male dancers to prey on the ladies’ loneliness.157 
Subsequently, the women sued for a refund under the doctrines of undue 
influence and misrepresentation. The courts focus on their vulnerability 
and the hope to become proficient in dancing to fill a void in their lives. 
In contrast, the old men were not hoodwinked because they were not 
vulnerable and were getting exactly what they paid for—the touch of a 
beautiful woman, or, putting it more vividly, a type of sexual 
encounter.158 Of course, the elderly women, all grandmothers, could not 
possibly have had such thoughts! 
Blake Morant, in his work on racial bias in the law, uses 
contextualism as both a descriptive and a normative device.159 The 
2007). Threedy notes, “Not all of the plaintiffs in the Arthur Murray cases are women, however. 
Some of the plaintiffs are men.” Threedy, supra note 153, at 759–60. 
156. Threedy sketches out the different gender narratives in which the elderly women are 
“vulnerable” to overreaching and the elderly men are astute purchasers of companionship. Threedy, 
supra note 153, at 761–67. 
157. Threedy provides a composite story taken from two of the cases: 
Lonely, vulnerable, typically elderly widow/spinster attends a dance class or demonstration at 
an Arthur Murray Studio. There, an attentive, presumably attractive, young male dance 
instructor “sweeps her off her feet” and in no time at all, she has signed up for hundreds, if not 
thousands, of hours of dance instruction, costing her thousands, if not tens of thousands, of 
dollars. 
Id. at 761 (discussing Vokes, 212 So. 2d at 907–08; Syester v. Banta, 133 N.W.2d 666, 669–70 
(Iowa 1965)). 
158. Threedy states that the Arthur Murray Dance Studies featured “touch dancing,” which she 
describes as “rhythmic movements [that] all invoke—let’s be frank here—a sexualized 
experience . . . .” Id. at 767. She also asserts that “men as a class have greater access to economic 
resources and thus can more easily be the consumer of companionship or sex.” Id. at 768. 
159. See Blake D. Morant, Law, Literature, and Contract: An Essay in Realism, 4 MICH. J. RACE 
& L. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Morant, Law, Literature, and Contract]; Blake D. Morant, The Relevance 
of Race and Disparity in Discussions of Contract Law, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 889 (1997) 
[hereinafter Morant, Race and Disparity]; Blake D. Morant, The Salience of Power in the 
Regulation of Bargains: Procedural Unconscionability and the Importance of Context, 2006 MICH. 
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influences of bias in the law and the application of law are a descriptive 
reality that can be fleshed out through an expanded contextual 
analysis.160 However, contextualism as a method to uncover illicit 
factors (such as racial or gender bias) in the law is also a device for legal 
reform to neutralize those factors (such as remedying biases when 
interpreting a contract or recognizing acts of bad faith). Once uncovered, 
law can overcome racial, gender, and other biases by formally 
recognizing them as part of the contextual factors a court should weigh 
in rendering its decision. James Elkins states: 
Some stories imagine law as the bulwark of tradition and, 
miraculously, the means by which we can free ourselves from 
the shackles of history. Other stories, particularly those of 
women, people of color, and those for whom the American 
Dream has been a cynical lie, are also implicated in stories of 
law.161 
These parallel stories are often not sufficiently told in casebooks. 
Morant asserts that law can be made more objective through the 
admission of more contextual evidence: “[T]he operation of contractual 
rules within the reality of human conduct belie the facade of 
objectivity.”162 He then poses a positive theory of contextualism to help 
make contract law true to its mission of objectivity. First, “judicial 
decisions should be evaluated contextually, as well as literally, in order 
to gain complete comprehension of its reasoning.”163 Second, “[w]hile 
[race, gender, and disparity] are not necessarily important in all contexts, 
they should be explored whenever they conspicuously or tacitly impact 
either the bargainers’ actions prior to formation, or the decisionmaker’s 
adjudication of the formed bargain.”164 The introduction of these factors 
as part of judicial analysis results in an initial deconstruction of contract 
law165 by “shatter[ing] contract law’s illusion of objectivity.”166 When 
ST. L. REV. 925 [hereinafter Morant, Procedural Unconscionability]; Blake D. Morant, The 
Teachings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Contract Theory: An Intriguing Comparison, 50 ALA. 
L. REV. 63 (1998) [hereinafter Morant, The Teachings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.]. 
160. See, e.g., Morant, Procedural Unconscionability, supra note 159 (contending that in order to 
understand the disproportionality of power in bargains, courts must more fully scrutinize the context 
of the bargain). 
161. Elkins, supra note 26, at 1. 
162. Morant, Race and Disparity, supra note 159, at 891.  
163. Id. at 893. 
164. Id. at 938. 
165. Morant, The Teachings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., supra note 159, at 71–72 (“The 
principal term here is realism—where theoretical constructs of bargaining relationships are 
deconstructed to allow for more proactive measures to counter pejorative conduct.”). 
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courts and substantive law openly acknowledge the influence of factors, 
such as bias and discrimination in contracts, the law is able to work 
towards greater objectivity and impartiality.167 In Morant’s embrace of 
contextualism, his brand of deconstruction is not to be equated with 
nihilistic destruction, but as a means to mold the current structure of 
contract rules to be more truthful and realistic, by broadening the scope 
of acceptable contextual evidence. This broadened narrative recognizes 
the impact of bargaining disparities (power) and biases (discrimination, 
stereotyping) to the application of legal rules.168 
In a previous work, I argued for the benefits of using works from 
other disciplines to illustrate the rationales for law, the greater context in 
which the legal order operates, and the relationship between law and 
society.169 Education theorists see the use of analytical frameworks from 
other disciplines as a method of teaching students to view a legal 
problem or issue from “multiple fram[es].”170 The law student, through 
the use of narrative, is asked to answer questions not just from a legal 
viewpoint, but from an economic or historical perspective as well. This 
allows students to view the law from internal and external perspectives. 
The internal view only exposes the student to the conceptual nature of 
law. The external view allows the student to critically analyze the law. 
The internal view trains the student to change their arguments as 
evidence dictates; to remain focused on the point or issue in question; 
and to deal with complex legal problems in a rational and efficient 
manner. The external view trains the student to keep an open mind; take 
into account the entire context of the case; look for options not internal 
to the law; and be sensitive to the other party’s position.171 
The narrative approach and other interdisciplinary approaches to 
understanding law and legal practice can be used to develop students’ 
emotional engagement and empathy—these skills are needed to better 
166. Id. at 70. 
167. Id. (“It also commensurately prompts discussion of methods to cure the transitional ills 
resulting from those problems.”). 
168. Morant, Law, Literature, and Contract, supra note 159, at 4 (“The goal is not to demolish 
contract rules, but to enhance their efficacy and remedial potential.”). 
169. Sandra K. Miller & Larry A. DiMatteo, Law in Context: Teaching Legal Studies Through 
the Lens of Extra-Legal Sources, 29 J. L. STUD. EDUC. 155 (2012). 
170. Id. at 158–59 (citing William M. Sullivan, Report on the Business, Entrepreneurship, and 
Liberal Learning Project of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (handout for 
the Sixth Annual Liberal Education and the Disciplines Breakfast Forum) (Jan. 29, 2011), available 
at http://www.aacu.org/leap/can/documents/Bill_Sullivan_Handout.pdf). 
171. Id. at 160–61 (citing Robert H. Ennis, Critical Thinking and Subject Specificity: 
Clarification and Needed Research, 18 EDUC. RESEARCHER 4, 4–10 (1989)). 
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relate to clients and to understand the position of opposing parties. Judge 
Posner has emphasized the importance of what he terms “good 
judgment” when deciding cases that lack clear-cut solutions—it is “an 
elusive faculty best understood as a compound of empathy, modesty, 
maturity, a sense of proportion, balance, a recognition of human 
limitations, sanity, prudence, a sense of reality, and common sense.”172 
The narrative approach provides those “other” details of the story not 
formally reported, which allows the student to better observe and 
sympathize with the human and societal dimensions of a case or series of 
cases. Judge John T. Noonan’s Persons and Masks of the Law warns of 
the tendency of lawyers and judges to allow abstract rules of law to 
obscure the human beings to whom those rules are applied.173 Noonan 
asserts that beginning with Holmes the law has been personified as a sort 
of living being: “By a form of misplaced concreteness, [Holmes] 
attributed to an abstraction the action of living men and 
women.”174 When that happens, the rules become masks that hide and 
render irrelevant the humanity of those affected by the law.175 The mere 
indoctrination of students in the substance of the law and the art of legal 
reasoning fails to develop these important skill sets. 
IV. STORIES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 
Legal scholars and practitioners have increasingly recognized the 
importance of placing American law and legal education in the context 
of comparative and international legal orders.176 Judge Merritt in the 
case of In re Desilets177 asserted that multijurisdictional practice was a 
172. RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 117 (2008).  
173. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, 
JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 6 (2002). 
174. Id. at 4. 
175. Noonan explains the detachment of rules from the humans for which they were created or 
applied as follows: 
Little or no attention is given to the persons in whose minds and in whose interaction the rules 
have lived—to the persons whose difficulties have occasioned the articulation of the rule, to 
the lawyers who have tried the case, to the judges who have decided it. 
Id. at 6. 
176. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why and How to Study “Transnational” Law, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 97 (2011); Peter L. Strauss, Transsystemia—Are We Approaching a New Langdellian 
Moment? Is McGill Leading the Way?, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 161 (2006); see also Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Ideal Law School for the 21st Century, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2011) 
(advocating that law schools should incorporate an International Legal Analysis course into first-
year curriculum). 
177. 291 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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“quotidian” part of modern legal practice.178 R. Michael Cassidy argues 
that “[l]awyers need a more panoramic view of the law to argue from 
analogy for an extension or novel application of domestic law.”179 For 
example, comparative law analysis demonstrates to the student that 
American legal rules are matters of choice among alternative rules. 
These alternative legal choices taken by other legal systems provide a 
source for advancing innovative arguments on behalf of clients and 
gaining insights on how best to reform existing law. 
Most recently, a Symposium entitled Building Global 
Professionalism: Emerging Trends in International and Transnational 
Legal Education180 included a number of articles providing case 
examples of how knowledge of international and comparative law 
directly impacts legal practice.181 A 2006 issue of the Journal of Legal 
Education provided a number of thought-provoking articles making the 
case for incorporating transnational and comparative law in first-year 
civil procedure, constitutional, criminal, and tort law.182 
From a practice point of view, international, comparative, and 
transnational perspectives are needed for lawyers to properly advise 
clients working in a global marketplace.183 Students graduating with 
such knowledge and perspectives will become increasingly marketable. 
Law schools recognize this fact and increasingly offer upper-level 
courses in international and comparative law. A few schools require 
such a course as part of the first-year curriculum.184 Although these 
178. Id. at 925. 
179. Cassidy, supra note 9, at 1522. 
180. 5 DREXEL L. REV. 285 (2013). 
181. Kerstin Carlson, Found in Translation: The Value of Teaching Law as Culture, 5 DREXEL L. 
REV. 407 (2013); Kath Hall, Educating Global Lawyers, 5 DREXEL L. REV. 391 (2013). 
182. See Helen Hershkoff, Integrating Transnational Legal Perspectives into the First Year Civil 
Procedure Curriculum, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 479 (2006); M. Stuart Madden, Integrating 
Comparative Law Concepts into the First Year Curriculum: Torts, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 560 (2006); 
Saqid Reza, Transnational Criminal Law and Procedure: An Introduction, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 430 
(2006); Neil S. Siegel, Some Modest Uses of Transnational Legal Perspectives in First-Year 
Constitutional Law, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 201 (2006). 
183. Anil Kalhan, Thinking Critically About International and Transnational Legal Education, 5 
DREXEL L. REV. 285, 288 (2013) (citing Claudio Grossman, Building the World Community 
Through Legal Education, in THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION 21, 30 
(Jan Klabbers & Mortimer N. S. Sellers eds., 2008)). 
184. See generally Anthony A. Tarr, Legal Education in a Global Context, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 
199 (2004) (arguing that law schools should develop strong international and comparative law 
programs). Some law schools have taken the step of changing their first-year curricula to include 
and international or comparative law course. In 2006, Harvard Law School announced that first-year 
law students would be required to take “one of three specially crafted courses introducing global 
legal systems”: Public International Law, International Economic Law, or Comparative Law. 
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courses are beneficial, weaving foreign narratives in core courses is 
needed to more effectively develop international and comparative law 
perspectives in the student skill set. The core casebooks (contract, tort, 
civil procedure, and so forth) need to provide international, comparative, 
and transnational law and practice materials. Teachers need to embrace 
these changes and proactively use them in teaching their courses.185 
The problem is that casebooks are already too long to include 
comparative law materials. The answer may be the use of a narrative 
approach that uses fewer cases, but provides additional contextual 
materials to examine the cases in depth and allow for teaching law much 
like a storyteller spins a tale. However, just providing these materials 
and leaving it for the teacher to construct the stories is not very efficient. 
The more radical and beneficial casebook would provide the stories that 
weave together different cases from different eras to show the 
development of legal rules, as well as the context and reasons behind 
those developments. 
CONCLUSION 
This is a time of great reflection involving all facets of legal 
education. This Symposium focused on one of those facets—the 
traditional casebook and case method of law instruction. The stack of 
appellate cases assembled by Christopher Columbus Langdell in 1871186 
rightly gave way to a more “realist” casebook beginning in earnest in the 
1930s. The “related materials” vary among major casebooks, but the 
template has remained relatively unchanged. It is not a novel suggestion 
that it may be time for a new type of casebook. The next generation of 
casebooks should, at least, partially apply a more narrative style as 
exhibited by Lawrence Cunningham’s highly original book, Contracts in 
the Real World: Stories of Popular Contracts and Why They Matter.187 
The case-centered focus of legal education will remain the coin of the 
realm, but its presentation in a narrative format, connecting a series of 
Rethinking Langdell: Historic changes in 1L curriculum set stage for new upper-level programs of 
study, HARVARD LAW SCH. (Dec. 2006), www.law.harvard.edu/news/today/dec_hlt_langdell.php. 
The University of Washington School of Law also provides a required first-year course entitled 
Comparative and International Law Survey. See Courses 2013 – 2014: LawA508: Comparative and 
International Law Survey, U. OF WASH. SCH. OF LAW (last updated Feb. 5, 2013, 8:40 AM), 
http://www.law.washington.edu/CourseCatalog/Course.aspx?YR=2013&ID=A508. 
185. Cassidy, supra note 9, at 1523 (“Many U.S. casebooks in core subject areas are beginning to 
incorporate comparative perspectives.”). 
186. CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1871). 
187. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4. 
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cases back in time and setting those cases in their appropriate contexts, 
should be explored. 
It may be time to scrap the label of “casebook” and return to what 
other disciplines simply refer to as a textbook or course pack.188 A legal 
“textbook” captures the essence of the task at hand to blend cases with 
practice-focused materials and comparative and international materials. 
The incorporation of the narrative approach into a new generation of law 
school “textbooks” will serve a number of important substantive goals. 
First, the acquisition and retention of substantive knowledge will be 
enhanced. The Arthur Murray case provides an example of the learning 
power of the narrative approach.189 The narrative approach, if properly 
used, can illustrate the variance between formal rules of law and law in 
action. Alternatively stated, it can show how case facts and the search 
for a seemingly just outcome leads to a divergence of formal from 
operative rules. Finally, the narrative approach shows how the spirit of 
law may be lost in the interest of doctrinal purity. 
A proper narrative approach illustrates the role of context in 
understanding judicial decisions. This context includes the 
acknowledged context found in the judicial opinion and the “unknown” 
contextual factors that likely influenced the decision, but were left 
outside the recognized legal canon. The power of narrative can expand 
the bracketed context of the formal text to include the range of factors 
and influences not reconcilable to the view of law as objective and 
impartial. It is in this deeper understanding of the realities of case 
decisions that practitioners of law can determine the factors, explicit and 
implicit (proper and improper), which are most predictive of a judicial 
outcome. It is in that deeper knowledge that a lawyer can best frame an 
argument on behalf of a client. 
A good story is easier to recall than a mere memorization of formal 
rules, exceptions, and legal nuance. The history of the effectiveness of 
oral histories, before the advent of written memorialization, attests to the 
power of the narrative approach. Stories may prove to be a more 
efficient means of knowledge acquisition, thus allowing for more time to 
introduce other core competency features into the curriculum, such as 
problem solving, drafting, counseling and negotiation exercises in the 
first-year courses. In the end, a re-tooling of the traditional law school 
casebook and the introduction of additional teaching methodologies in 
188. A Washington Law Review survey shows that among textbooks and other materials, the use 
of “Course Packs” rated as the third most popular form of course materials used, beyond two more 
popular casebooks. Wash. Law Review Survey Results, supra note 15, at 3. 
189. See supra notes 153–158 and accompanying text. 
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the first-year curriculum will not cure the ills of American legal 
education, but they should be explored as part of the overall revamping 
of how and what we teach in our law schools. 
 
 
